Chinese Nationalism and the Nanjing Massacre

So what is Chinese nationalism, and what does it have to do with the Nanjing Massacre which is the subject of the podcasts that you will be listening to? This is a much bigger topic of course than I can take on in this one blog, but let me try to provide a little context. First of all, most scholars agree that Chinese nationalism (and nationalism as a general term) is a modern invention. Nationalism is closely tied with the emergence of the nation-state. Both concepts have their origins in the European experience. Here the nation refers to a group of people who enjoy a common cultural or ethnic bond, and the state refers to an independent country with a sovereign government, clear territorial boundaries and a loyal population. Nationalism refers to pride in and loyalty to the nation-state, or a desire to establish a nation-state. Nationalism is a particularistic force that sees one’s people as distinct from other peoples or nations.

These concepts of nationalism and the nation-state become relevant to China after its encounter with European powers in the Opium War of 1840-42. Prior to this time, China saw itself as a civilization based on a set of universalistic principles that other civilizations could adopt. Chinese culture, not the nation-state, was the focus of people’s loyalty. But the Opium War and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-85 forced China’s integration into the modern interstate system. China no longer saw itself as a universalistic civilization superior to all others, but as one nation-state among a community of states. Chinese elites in the early 20^th century began to use norms associated with nationalism and the nation-state – sovereignty, territorial integrity and the equality of states – to defend its own borders from the incursions of imperialist powers. Nationalist discourse occupies a prominent place in the Revolution of 1911, in Sun Yatsen’s writings, in the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and in the formation of both the KMT and the CCP. (Not surprisingly, we also see nationalism on the rise in the rest of Asia during this period.)

Thus, Japan’s invasion of China in 1936 occurs just when nationalism is on the rise in China. By this time, nationalism had become an effective way to gain popular support and unify the masses, certainly more effective than other ideologies that were being debated at the time such as liberalism, fascism, anarchism, and perhaps even Marxism. Indeed, some scholars have argued that appeals to nationalism, rather than to Marxist principles, were a major reason for the CCP’s rise to power in the 1930s and 1940s.

Chinese Nationalism and Tibet: Take the Chinese seriously

In the last few weeks, the headlines here in China and abroad have been inundated with news about the uprisings in Tibet, and the international and domestic response to these uprisings. A major leitmotif that runs through many of these stories is Chinese nationalism. What we are seeing in these media reports, and in the blogosphere, is an outpouring of nationalism and patriotism on the part of Chinese both in China and abroad. These Chinese resent the way that the Chinese government and the Chinese themselves have been portrayed. They complain that Westerners are quick to jump on China for problems with human rights and food safety without recognizing the tremendous progress China has made in the past few decades. They support the Chinese government’s position on a unified China, and point out that people in the West use a double standard with regard to Tibet. Westerners, they say, get all riled up about Tibetan independence, but remain silent on independence for Palestinians, Kurds, and other oppressed peoples around the world. Why should all their anger be directed at China, particularly a China that has developed so successfully, lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and restored a sense of pride and dignity to the Chinese nation?

It’s worth quoting here from Wenran Jiang’s April 4 op-ed piece in the Toronto Globe and Mail. Jiang, a well-respected Chinese-born political science professor from Canada, writes:

“For their part, many in the Chinese diaspora have exhibited a strong sense of nationalism that opposes any Tibetan independence movement and resents any form of boycott of the Beijing Olympics. What is surprising, however, is the very high level of mobilization of Chinese public opinion that is not as much a response to Beijing's rallying calls for national unity as it is a strong reaction to what many Chinese perceive as the one-sided reporting of the Tibetan unrests by the mainstream Western press. Chinese people everywhere want their side of the Tibet story told.

Unlike in 1989, when Chinese all over the world, including scholars and students from the mainland, protested against the government crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square, Chinese people have taken to streets this time in support of Beijing. In the past week, such rallies have taken places in European cities, in Montreal and Calgary, and one is expected in Edmonton this weekend.

While many overseas Chinese believe that Beijing's extremely harsh and hostile words against the Dalai Lama are neither effective nor well received by the Western public, they still see mainstream Western news media as being excessively anti-China. (Many noted errors in the reporting, including the mislabeling of photos of Indian and Nepalese police confronting demonstrating monks as Chinese soldiers cracking down in Tibet.) They have fed their observations back to Chinese cyberspace instantly, and what we are witnessing is an emerging synergy of cybernationalism connecting many Chinese at home and abroad.

But what has propelled this strident nationalism? Why has the disdain for Tibet independence and its ambitions become so highly charged and emotional? Hasn't the Chinese Communist Party simply been using nationalism as a tool of legitimacy for staying in power? Aren't most Chinese brainwashed since childhood?

First of all, there is an overwhelming sense among the Han Chinese (the country's predominant ethnic group) that Tibet has been part of China for centuries. True, Chinese control over Tibet was weakened when China was invaded by Western powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. But the Han have not forgotten the earlier ties. As well, Central Intelligence Agency-funded Tibetan covert operations against China in most of the Cold War years are well documented, stirring further resentment. As such, historical memory ensures that in the minds of the Han, any perceived attempts to separate Tibet from China will be linked with the humiliation the Chinese suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism. So, to most Chinese, a potential boycott of the Beijing Olympics is viewed as a denial of China's moment in restoring its respectable position in the world.

Second, many Chinese deeply believe to this day that the People's Republic of China has lifted Tibet's people out of a medieval serfdom that was degrading to the majority of Tibetans, especially women. The attitude, felt particularly by the communist and socialist idealists, is not unlike that felt some years ago by many in North America who saw the spread of their European culture as bringing civilization to the native people. Just as aboriginal children were put in boarding schools and forced to learn English, many Chinese thought they were giving emancipation to an oppressed people under the name of socialism and progress. While not denying Chinese policy failures in Tibet over the years, many reacted angrily to the recent charge that they were committing "cultural genocide" in Tibet. They point out that what China did in Tibet is generous in contrast to how native Indians were treated in North America over 400 years.

Finally, many Han Chinese also think Tibetans should appreciate the tremendously high level of financial and other support that has been poured into their region, both from the central government, in the form of subsidies, and from the market adventurists who have invested heavily in the area in recent years. To the Han, such economic development is seen as eliminating poverty and bringing prosperity to the ordinary people of Tibet, as in the rest of China. That's why the shocking images of angry young Tibetans violently attaching Han Chinese and other non-Tibetans made Chinese people recoil in indignation. (Even though they might note that while the gap between the rich and poor in the rest of China is mostly a distribution issue, the division line between the haves and have-nots appears to be drawn along ethnic lines in Tibet.)

Taken together, these historically-conditioned perceptions will continue to shape events. And failing to understand the deep-rooted emotions on both sides will not only hinder potential solutions to the complex issues involved, but may risk generating further divisions.”

Note the connection Jiang makes between the Chinese nationalism on display today and the earlier Chinese nationalism that arose in response to Western and Japanese imperialism. These expressions of nationalism, and the arguments that come out of them, have to be taken seriously by anyone who seeks to understand and deal with a rising China. Otherwise, we risk alienating an important global player, not to mention a major portion of the world’s population. We also risk aggravating already serious misunderstandings and misperceptions between Westerners and Chinese. And indeed, a number of things said about China’s treatment of Tibet by Western media and groups like the Free Tibet movement have been guilty of fanning the flames of Chinese nationalism by portraying China as a big bully, and calling for the international community to boycott the Olympics.